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Abstract 
We introduce and analyze the problem of the compilation of decision models from a. decision-theoretic 
perspective. The techniques described allow us to evaluate various configurations of compiled knowledge 
given the nature of evidential relationships in a. domain, the utilities associated with alternative actions, 
the costs of run-time delays, and the costs of memory. We describe procedures for selecting a subset of the 
total observations available to be incorporated into a. compiled situation-action mapping, in the context 
of a binary decision with conditional independence of evidence. The methods allow us to incrementally 
select the best pieces of evidence to add to the set of compiled knowledge in an engineering setting. After 
presenting several approaches to compilation, we exercise one of the methods to provide insight into the 
relationship between the distribution over weights of evidence and the preferred degree of compilation. 
1 Introduction 
There has been growing interest in reducing complex deliberation in computer-based reasoners by devel­
oping decision-making techniques that rely on precomputed or compiled responses. In particular, recent 
reactive planning research has centered on the replacement of unwieldy solution mechanisms and detailed 
representations of knowledge with compiled strategies that enable agents to respond, in reflex fashion, to 
relatively simple perceptual inputs[1,3]. It has been hoped that, for many contexts, explicit representations 
and deliberation will not be necessary for sufficient performance. 
To date, most of the work on compilation has been done in the absence of theoretical foundations of 
decision making under uncertainty. The goal has been to create reasoners with satisficing behavior. However, 
there has been growing interest in the optimal design of problem solvers and solution methodologies through 
the application of normative principles [8]. In this paper, we describe methods for the efficient representation 
and indexing of precomputed actions from a perspective of bounded optimality. Bounded-optimal systems 
perform ideally in some context or set of contexts under expected constraints in reasoning resources, such as 
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in time and memory [9]. We define optimality in the context of a decision-theoretic analysis of the costs and 
benefits of alternative hardware configurations and strategies for determining the best action. As viewed 
from the perspective of decision analysis, the compilation techniques to date [14,1,3,11] typically have been 
suboptimal as investigators have relied on ad hoc models. 
Recent discussions on compilation, from the decision-theoretic perspective, have explored the derivation 
and consistency of compiled situation-action rules from underlying normative decision models [2] and the 
relationship of heuristics to decision-theoretic models [12]. It has been suggested that decision-theoretic 
approaches to the compilation of action, and the integration of compiled and computed approaches, may be 
useful in the development of tractable normative reasoning systems [9]. Indeed, recent work on the speed up 
of probabilistic inference through caching probabilistic results has been promising [7]. The development of 
elegant and theoretically sound techniques for compiling useful patterns of behavior undoubtedly will help 
enhance our understanding of the production of inexpensive, fast-acting, and well-characterized computa­
tional agents from more complex, explicit models of problem solving. Formal analyses can enable us to probe 
mathematically the relationships among parameters of problem solvers and domains, allowing us to glean 
new insights about compilation. Such insights may evade us in the context of less rigorous analyses. 
We address the reactive-planning problem from a decision-theoretic perspective. Our analysis centers 
on the application of knowledge about (1) the nature of evidential relationships in a domain, (2) the utilities 
associated with alternative actions, (3) the costs of run-time delay, and ( 4) the costs of memory. Our model 
provides intuition about the nature of ideal compilation strategies as a function of these parameters. The 
approach is similar in spirit to recent work on the control of probabilistic inference that applies knowledge 
about inference progress and future belief distributions to reasoning about the expected value of computation 
[10]. In this work, we analyze several approaches to compilation and explore the effects that different 
assumptions about the distribution of evidence can be expected to have on the optimal configuration of 
compiled knowledge. 
2 A Model for Diagnosis 
A simple model for diagnosis is represented by the influence diagram pictured in Figure 1. In this model, 
the utility of a situation, represented by the diamond-shaped node, labeled U, depends on (1) whether a 
particular hypothesis H is true or false, and (2) whether an action D is taken or not. We cannot observe 
H directly; rather, we are forced to do inference about the relative likelihood of H by observing pieces of 
evidence E�, E2, ... , En· Thus, we seek to make a decision about a best action in the general case where we 
have incomplete information about the world. We shall simplify our analysis by considering the case where 
D, H, and the Ei's are binary-valued variables (i.e., are true or false). To simplify our model further, we 
shall assume that all evidence is conditionally independent, given H or ...,H. In Section 5, we examine how 
these assumptions can be relaxed. Finally, for definiteness, we assume that it is appropriate to take action 
D (as opposed to ...,D) if H is true. 
Using the assumption of conditional independence of evidence, given the hypothesis and its negation, we 
can calculate the posterior probability of the hypothesis by multiplying together all of the likelihood ratios, 
P�JL'W), with the prior odds, P1L'W). 
p(HJEi, ... ,Em) p(EtJH) p(EmiH) p(H) 
P(-,HJEi, . . .  , Em) = p(EtJ-,H) ... p(EmJ-,H) p(...,H) 
This equation can be written more compactly in odds form, as 
m 
O(HJE,, ... , Em)= O(H) II Ai (1) 
i:;;l 
where >., is the likelihood ratio P��iL'W). Thus, we require m multiplications for a complete update in light 
of m pieces of evidence. 
Because D and H are binary, we can simplify our reasoning about whether we should take action D 
by calculating a threshold probability, p•, for the decision. This threshold probability is defined as the 
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Figure 1: An influence-diagram representation of the diagnosis problem. The utility (diamond node, U) 
depends on a hypothesis (circular node, H) and a decision (square node, D). All evidence is available at the 
time the decision is made. 
probability H at which we are indifferent between acting and not acting. That is, we define p* as the point 
where acting and not acting have equal utility, or 
p*U(H,D) + (1- p*)U(-.H,D) = p•U(H,-.D) + (1- p")U(-.H,-.D) 
It is better to act if and only if p(HIE1 . . . , Em) > p•. In terms of the odds formulation, we wish to act if 
and only if 
p• O(HIE1, . . .  ,Em) 2:: -1 -. 
-p 
The weight of evidence, w;, is defined as the log of the likelihood ratio, In.\;. Mapping likelihood ratios 
into weights of evidence allows us to update belief in a probability through the addition of the weights of 
evidence. (See [4) for a discussion of the use of weights of evidence in the analysis of belief-updating schemes 
in formalisms for managing uncertainty in artificial intelligence.) We can rewrite the threshold-probability 
condition in terms of the log-likelihood ratio where w1 =In A;. It is better to act if and only if 
m • 
"""" p • W = LJ Wi 2:: In� -In O(H) = W 
i=l p 
(2) 
In this expression, w• is the threshold sum of weights of evidence for the decision problem. We will use 
this formulation of diagnostic decision making, in conjunction with the assumption that all evidence is 
conditionally independent, to analyze the tradeoffs associated with computation versus compilation. 
3 Computation Versus Compilation 
Given a simple decision problem defined within the model of diagnosis and analytic framework described in 
Section 2, two fundamental design alternatives are: 
1. Compute. Endow our computational decision maker with the ability to perform probabilistic inference 
in real-time, and commit to a decision that maximizes expected utility. That is, given a vector of 
information about the truth status of all of the relevant evidence, we compute 
m 
the sum of the weights of evidence for all observations. We act if and only if W > w·. 
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2. Compile. Select n pieces of evidence, 
and calculate n 
Wn= L wc, 
i=l 
for each possible instance of the variables in Ec. If Wn exceeds w•, we store D in a lookup table; 
otherwise, we store -.D. There are 2" possible observations; thus, to access the compiled solutions, 
we require a memory cache of a size that grows exponentially with the number of pieces of evidence 
considered (an n-dimensional array). 
3.1 Net Inferential Value 
We wish to compare the relative costs and benefits of these two alternatives. To do so, we determine the 
net inferential value (NIV) of each alternative. The net inferential value of an alternative is the expected 
net present value of that alternative over the entire lifetime of its use. In this paper, we decompose this 
value into three components. The first component is the expected value of the recommendations provided 
by each method. In the general case, the compilation method will ignore some available information. Thus, 
the quality of its recommendations typically will be lower than those derived from computing. The second 
component is the memory requirements of computation and compilation. Finally, we must consider the cost 
of processing time, based in delayed response, when a case presents itself. This cost may be depend on 
whether H is true (e.g., suppose H is the hypothesis that a patient is having a heart attack). 
Let EV compute denote the expected value of a system committed to the compute policy for a single 
episode. Also, let PC�mputeand PC,;;,"%putedenote the processing costs for computation given H is true and 
false, respectively. Finally, let MCcompute be the the memory costs associated with the compute policy. Let 
EVcompile, PC!mpile• PC�!pile• and MCcampile denote similar quantities for the compile policy. It follows 
that the net inferential values of the compute and compile policies are 
NIVcampute = r [EVcompute- PC!mpute p(H)- PC,;;,!pute p(-.H)] � MCcampute (3) 
NIVcampile = r (EVcampile- PC�mpile p(H) � PC��pile p(-.H)j- MCcampite (4) 
where r is a factor that converts the expected value of each policy on a single problem instance to a 
summary (present) value for a series of problem instances over the life of the system. (A discussion of 
bounded optimality and related issues on the value of a reasoning system over a lifetime and over a specific 
time horizon is found in [9].) We choose to compute if and only if 
NIV compu te � NIV compile (5) 
In our simple model for inference, Equation 2, the expected value of a system c ommitted to the compute 
policy for a single episode is 
EVcompute [p(W > w"IH) U(H, D)+ p(W S w"IH) U(H, --,fl)] p(H) + 
[p(W > W"I-,H) U(-.H, D)+ p(W S W"!-.H) U(-.H, -,D)] p(-.H) 
The similar expression for compilation is 
EVcompiie" = [p(Wn > W"IH) U(H,D)+ p(Wn S W"IH) U(H,-.D)] p(H) + 
(6) 
[p(Wn > W"i-.H) U(-.H,D)+p(Wn S W"i...,H) U(-.H,-.D)] p(--,H) (7) 
The processing time for computation is linear in the total number of pieces of evidence. The processing 
time for the compile policy is also linear in the total number of pieces of evidence , but the proportionality 
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constant is smaller. Also, for simplicity, we assume that the cost of delay is linear in the length of the delay. 
Thus, we obtain 
PC!mpute = k1m (8) 
PC�!pute = k2m (9) 
PC!,mpile k3n (10) 
PC��pile k4n (11) 
The amount of memory required for computing is linear in the number of pieces of evidence, because we 
have to store p(E,fH) and p(Ed•H), or their likelihood ratio equivalents, for each evidence variable. The 
memory required for compilation is exponential in n, the number of evidence variables considered. Again, 
for simplicity, we assume that the cost associated with the use of memory is proportional to the amount of 
memory required. Thus, 
MCcompute = ksm 
MCcompile = ks2" 
Combining Equations 5 through 13, we choose to compute if and only if 
(12) 
(13) 
r[EVcompute- (ktp(H) + k2p(•H))m]- ksm � r[EYcompile- (k3p(H) + k4p(•H))n]- ks2" (14) 
To complete the computation of net inferential value, we must evaluate p(W > w•fH) and p(W :5 w•JH). 
For one piece of evidence, we have 
w; p(wdH) p(w;J•H) 
In p�,�  p( ,,., ) p(E;fH) p(Ed•H) 
In �(-.E;!� 
p -.E",!-. l p(•E;fH) p(•E;f-,H) 
To simplify the our notation, we let p(E;IH) = a and p(E;j-,H) = /3. The expectation and variance of w 
given H and -,fl is then 
a (1- n) EV(wfH) =a ln 73 + (1- a) In (1 _ ;J) 
a (1-a) EV(wi•H) = ;Jln 73 + (1- ;J) In (1 _ {J) 
2a(l- ;J) Var(wfH) = a(1- n)ln 
;J(1- a) 
2a(1-;J) Var(wf•H) = ;J(1- ;J)ln 
;J(1- a) 
(15) 
(16) 
We can now take advantage of the additive property of weights of evidence. The central limit theorem 
states that sum of independent random variables approaches a normal distribution when the number of 
variables becomes large. Furthermore, the expectation and variance of the sum is just the sum of the 
expectations and variances of the individual random variables, respectively. Because we have assumed that 
evidence variables are independent, given H or -,fl, the expected value of the sum of the weights of evidence 
Wn is 
n 
EV(W,.fH) = EEV(w;fH) 
i=l 
The variance of the sum of the weights is 
n 
Var(W,.fH) = L Var(w;IH) 
i=l 
Thus p(W,. fH), the probability distribution over Wn as a function of the number of pieces of evidence, is 
n n 
p(WnfH) ,._ N(LEV(w;fH),LVar(w;fH)) 
i:l 
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(17) 
. ' 
+ 
W* 
Figure 2: The probability that the total evidential weight will exceed the threshold weight is the area under 
the normal curve above the threshold probability (shaded region) . 
The equation for -.H is similar. If n = m and we compile all the evidence variables, the expressions for 
computing and compiling are identical. Note that if m or n is small, making use of the central limit theorem 
inappropriate, we can compute the expression for the mean and variance of Wn directly. 
Given the distributions for H and -.H, we can now evaluate Equations 6 and 7 using an estimate or 
table of the cumulative normal distribution. We have 
1 1"" -(•,-I'll p(Wn > W*IH) = J'iC. e " dt G'y21r w· (18) 
where J.l = EV(WniH) and u = Var(WniH). The probability that the weight will exceed W* corresponds 
to the shaded area in Figure 2. Note that the foregoing analysis presumes that a subset of the total evidence 
has been selected and is available for compiling. In the next section, we address various methods for directing 
this selection. 
3.2 Choice of Evidence to Compile 
Let us now examine how can we select a subset of evidence, whose relevance we wish to consider for inclusion 
in a situation-action compilation. Each piece of evidence is associated with a pair of negative and positive 
weights. We would like to select those pieces of evidence that make the largest contributions to Wn on an 
expected basis, considering their discriminatory power, measured by P�'f�L�), and their probabilities of being 
observed, p(EIH). Several strategies for directing the selection are possible, including (1) exhaustive search, 
(2) hill-climbing, and (3) stochastic simulation. Herskovits [7] discusses the third approach. In this section, 
we consider the second alternative. 
Assume that we have already selected n pieces of evidence for inclusion in the compiled set, and that we 
now wish to determine which remaining piece of evidence should be included in the set. In this approach, we 
assume that any new piece of evidence included in the set will be the last piece to be included. Using Equa­
tion 4, we calculate NIV�o�pile for each prospective piece of evidence, and choose the piece that maximizes 
NIV��pil�· If the value of NIV�o�pile exceeds the value of NIV�ompile• we include in the compilation set 
this new piece of evidence, and repeat this procedure. Otherwise, we stop searching for evidential variables 
to cache. 
W hen the search procedure halts, or when additional analysis suggests that no additional evidence 
should be cached, we compare the net inferential value of the compilation alternative that we have generated 
with the net inferential value of computation. We choose to compile if and only if the former value exceeds 
the latter. Notice that our search procedure is heuristic; it suffers from the usual problems associated with 
greedy algorithms. Fortunately, standard techniques for relaxing the degree of myopia can be used to improve 
the approach. For example, to decrease the chance of halting at a local maximum of net inferential value, 
we can employ a lookahead procedure, evaluating net inferential value through one or more iterations of the 
algorithm, after such values begin to decline. The requirement and usefulness of various degrees of lookahead 
in building situation-action trees will have to be determined by analysis of real domains. 
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Figure 3: An asymmetrical situation-action tree. If E1 is true, then we immediately act (select D). If E7 is 
false, then we observe Ea. If Ea is false, then we do not act (-,D). If Ea is true, then we observe E6. We 
then act if and only if E6 is true. 
4 Alternative Compilation Strategies 
In Section 3, we considered the limited set of compilation alternatives in which the appropriate decision for 
every possible instance of an evidential subset E., is stored. In this section, we broaden the alternatives for 
compilation to include the caching of situation-action rules in asymmetrical trees. An example of such a 
tree, called a situation-action tree, is shown in Figure 3. Each path from the root to a leaf node in the 
tree represents a particular situation. The situations in the tree are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. The 
decision at each leaf in node in the tree contains the appropriate action for the situation represented by the 
path to that node. If evidential variable E1 is true, then we act immediately (select D). If E1 is false, then 
we observe Ea. If Ea is false, then we do not act (select -,D). If Ea is true, then we observe E6. We then 
act if and only if E6 is true. Note that the alternatives for compilation discussed in Section 3 correspond to 
situation-action trees that are symmetric. 
The computation of NIV compile for the compilation alternative represented by the tree in Figure 3 is 
straightforward. If either {E7} or {...,E1, Ea, E6} is observed, then we select D. The probabilities of observing 
either of these mutually exclusive situations, given H and -,H, are 
and 
respectively. Given these expressions and similar expressions for the two paths in the situation-action tree 
in which ...,D is prescribed, it follows that the expected value of the system's actions is 
EVcompile = [p(E1IH) + p(•E1IH) p(EaiH) p(E5jH)] U(H, D) p(H) + 
[p(E1I•H) + p(•E1I•H) p(Eai•H) p(E61•H)] U(...,H, D) p(...,H) + 
[p(•E1jH) p(•EaiH) + p(•E1IH) p(EaiH) p(...,EsiH)] U(H, -,D) p(H) + 
[p(•E1I•H) p(-.Eai•H) + p(•E1j-.H) p(Eaj-.H) p(•E6j-,H)] U(...,H,-.D) p(•H) 
Thus, because there are seven nodes in the tree, the net inferential value of the compilation alternative 
represented by the tree in Figure 3 becomes 
NIVcompile = rEVcompile -7ksk6 
where ke is cost of storing a node in an situation-action tree relative to the cost of storing the action in an 
array. To simplify the analysis, we have ignored the logarithmic processing cost for lookups in the tree. 
In general, let £v and E-.v be the set of all situations in a situation-action tree in which actions D 
and •D are prescribed, respectively. Let each situation E, be represented by the set of observations.in that 
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. .  
situation. The expected value of the actions prescribed by the tree is 
EV�ompile [ L II p(EIH)l U(H, D) p(H) + 
seen EeE 
[ L II p(E!-,H)l U(-,H,D) p(--,H) + 
seen EeE 
[ L II p(EIH)l U(H, -,D) p(H) + 
Ee£-n EeE 
[ L II p(EI--,H)l U(-.,H,-.,D) p(...,H) 
EEC-n EeE 
(19) 
where E refers to a particular piece of evidence (true or false) in the situation E. The net inferential value 
of the compilation alternative associated with the tree then becomes 
NIV�ompile = rEV�ompile - ksk611£11 
where 11£11 is the number of nodes in the tree. 
(20) 
Given a set of evidence variables and associated probabilities, we can use Equations 19 and 20 to direct 
the c onstruction of a situation-action tree. We apply a. hill-climbing search to the space of evidence variables 
similar to the approach described in the previous section. In this case, however, we consider extending each 
leaf node separately in the partially constructed situation-action tree. Specifically, we begin with the null 
situation-action tree in which no evidence is observed. We compute the optimal action using Equation 2, 
and then evaluate the net inferential value of this compilation alternative using Equations 19 and 20. We 
then consider each situation-action tree in which only one piece of evidence is observed. Again, we use 
Equation 2 to determine the appropriate action for each situation, and then use Equations 19 and 20 to 
evaluate the net inferential value of each situation-action tree. If none of the trees have values that are 
greater than the value of the null tree, we halt. Otherwise, we select the tree with the greatest net inferential 
value, and apply this procedure recursively to each branch of the situation-action tree. 
As in the previous algorithm, when the search procedure halts, we then compare the net inferential 
value of the compilation alternative that we have generated with the net inferential value of computation. 
We choose to compile if and only if the former value exceeds the latter. As mentioned in the previous 
section, extending this algorithm with a lookahead procedure and other standard techniques for improving 
hill-climbing approaches should produce better alternatives for compilation. 
The number of alternatives for compilation can be extended further. For example, we can imagine 
caching arbitrary sets of situation-action pairs. An efficient data structure for indexing such sets is a trie 
[7]. Two interesting problems arise with this approach. First, with the previous compilation methods, there 
has always been a unique cached situation that matches the observed evidence. Now, however, more than 
one cached situation may match the observed evidence (e.g., we cache only the two situations { E1, --,E2} and 
{ E1, Ea} and we observe the evidence E1 ,...,E2, and E3). Approaches to handling this problem include the 
use of heuristic prioritization rules for making decisions about best matches and a commitment to default 
actions. There is also opportunity for applying decision analysis to selecting among alternative strategies for 
handling such incompleteness, given k nowledge about the contents of the current situation-action tree. The 
formula for the net inferential value for such compilation alternatives of this form is similar to Equations 
19 and 20. Second, the use of a greedy algortihm for identifying arbitrary sets of situation-action pairs 
that are valuable to cache is not as straightforward as in the previous compilation methods. A promising 
alternative to greedy search for selecting these pairs stochastic simulation. This approach has been explored 
by Herskovits [7]. 
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5 Relaxation of the Assumptions 
Our analysis contains several strong assumptions. Several of these assumptions can be relaxed with little 
effort. First, the odds-likelihood inference rule, Equation 1, and its logarithmic transform, can be extended 
easily to include multiple-valued evidential variables. In addition, the computation of means and variances 
for multiple-valued evidential variables (see Equations 15 and 16) is straightforward. Consequently, our 
analysis is not tied to pieces of evidence that are two-valued. 
Once multiple-valued pieces of evidence are allowed, we can extend our results to inferential models in 
which evidence is conditionally dependent using a clustering technique described by Pearl [13] (pp. Hl7-204). 
This technique is efficient only when there are no large undirected cycles in a belief network that represents 
the dependencies among the evidence. There are domains such as pathology [5] in which this requirement for 
efficient analysis is satisfied. In some domains, however, the cycles are too large for the clustering approach 
to be effective [6]. 
Our approach can also be extended to include multiple-valued hypotheses and decisions. The algebra 
becomes more complex, however, because the simple p• model for action no longer applies. 
We have also implicitly assumed that the cost of observing each evidential variable is zero. We can avoid 
making this assumption by including the cost of such observations in Equations 3, 4, and 20. In the case 
where asymmetric situation-action trees are an alternative for compilation, the variables observed depend 
on the outcome of previous observations. The algebra is extensive but straightforward. 
6 Analysis of Prototypical Distributions 
Our initial model relied on a complete characterization of the evidence used by a reasoning system in 
determining the probability of a proposition , and in choosing an optimal action. That is, we have assumed 
that we have access to the diagnostic relevance of each piece of evidence, as well as information about 
the probability of seeing that available evidence. In this section, we use more abstract descriptions of the 
patterns of evidence in a domain. In particular, we summarize the evidence in a domain by specifying a 
frequency distribution function over the strengths of the pieces of evidence. We can gain intuition about the 
compilation process by performing the analysis for some prototypical evidence patterns. 
We have performed an analysis of the expected effects of compilation on the quality of decision rec­
ommendations, given the assumption that p(E;!H) = 1- p(E;I--.H). This assumption imposes a symmetry 
in the confirmatory and disconfirmatory relevance of evidence weights, The primary ramification of the 
assumption of evidential symmetry is that evidence associated with higher likelihood ratios is more likely 
to be observed. Therefore, we can perform the summations described in the previous section by simply 
integrating over the pieces of evidence with the highest log-likelihood ratios, avoiding the evidence selection 
procedure described in Section 3.2. We have analyzed the relationship between compiling and computing 
for various distributions over weights, given this symmetry assumption. 
Figure 4 shows a family of distributions for the weights of evidence. The curves plot the number of 
pieces of evidence having a particular log-likelihood ratio, w. A w of 0 has a likelihood ratio of 1 implying 
p(EIH) = p(EI--.H) = .5; thus, the distributions with more mass close to 0 are less informative. We have 
selected three linear patterns of likelihood ratios to illustrate the the effects of different levels of compilation. 
The distribution with more mass close to the origin indicates a model with a higher overall level of uncertainty. 
Figure 5 displays Gaussian distributions of Wn, the sum of the compiled weights of evidence (given 
H). Each curve corresponds to a number of pieces of evidence, n, being included in the compiled set. 
The mean and variance of the distributions are calculated as in Equation 17 using the "Moderate" frequency 
distribution from Figure 4. Each level of compilation corresponds to constructing the compiled set of evidence 
by selecting those evidential variables whose log likelihood-ratios exceed a particular weight. Notice that, 
as we compile more pieces of evidence, the expectation and variance of the sums increase. Also, for higher 
levels of compilation, the probability that Wn is less than w• decreases, indicating a lower probability of 
mistreatment as evidence is added to the compiled set. 
Using these distributions, we can calculate the difference in expected value between computing and 
compiling for the different decay rates. The loss is the difference between EV compute and EV compile, calculated 
using Equations 6 and 7. The expected losses in fractional terms based on compilation is shown in Figure 6 as 
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. .  
400. 
Frequency 
.5 1.0 1.5 
Log likelihood ratio 
Figure 4: A family of frequency distributions over weights of evidence for various levels of uncertainty. 
The curve labeled "High" has weights of evidence close to zero, i ndicating substantial uncertainty. The 
"Moderate" and "Low" curves reflect lower levels of uncertainty, as measured by total evidence weights. 
0.14 
0.12 
P(Wn IH) 0.1 
0.08 
0.0 
0.04 
0.02 
-5. 20. 
Sum of Compiled Weights 
Figure 5: Probability distributions for the sum of weights of ev idence (given H) for various levels of compi­
lation, n. These distributions are based on the "Moderate" uncertainty curve. 
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Fractional 
Loss 
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0.0 
81 
Number of Items Compiled 
Figure 6: Fractional loss in expected value due to lower quality recommendations with compilation as a 
function of the number of evidence items compiled for various uncertainty profiles. As the number of pieces 
of evidence included in the compiled increases, the fractional loss decreases. For a given level of computation, 
the fractional loss is greater for higher levels of uncertainty. 
a function of the number of pieces of evidence compiled. For the "Low" uncertainty pattern, there are several 
strong pieces of evidence, and therefore the losses due to compiling are small. Including about 16 elements 
in the compiled set results in less than a 1% reduction in performance. W hen uncertainty is greater, there 
are more substantial losses at a given level of compilation, as shown in the figure. A compilation strategy 
for the "High" uncertainty case which had only 1% degradation would require on the order of 50 pieces of 
evidence in the compiled set for a 250 bit memory cache. 
Although the foregoing analysis verifies our intuition regarding the behavior of compile/compute trade­
off's for simplified decision models, there are substantial opportunities for enhancing the analysis. In partic­
ular, we plan to examine empirical data regarding the pattern of weights of evidence for actual domains to 
seek more realistic characterizations of prototypical distributions and to extend the analytical results. 
7 Conclusions 
We have introduced and exercised a decision-theoretic approach to trading off the costs and benefits of 
computation versus compilation. The method allows us to use an agent's utilities and beliefs to select the 
best pieces of evidence to compile at design time. We described alternative approaches to compilation, 
and then exercised our initial approach to gain intuition about the relationship between the distribution 
over weights of evidence and the ideal configuration of compilation. Although we have based our analysis 
on a simple decision model, many of the insights gleaned are relevant to more complex problems. Our 
assumptions about the binary nature of the decisions, hypotheses, and evidence, and about independence 
among pieces of evidence gave us model that allows for the easy computation of an optimal decision. In more 
complex situations, there will be greater pressures to compile. Frequently, however, there also will be greater 
demands on memory as the models are made more complex. There is ample opportunity to extend the 
analysis presented here. Our goal is to turn such analyses to evaluate alternative reactive-planning strategies 
in specific real-world problems. 
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